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Abstract
The aim of this work is to compare and contrast different ways of modeling financial
shocks and financial intermediaries in the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
models (DSGE models) and to discuss the empirical evidence on the importance of
modeling financial sector and financial shocks in the economy. The analysis is based
on four papers on the matter Jerman and Quiadrini (2009) [9], Christiano, Motto and
Rostagno (2006) [5] , Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) [8] , and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2009) [7].
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1 Introduction
The motivation of Jerman and Quiadrini (2009) [9], Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
(2006) [5], Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) [8], and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) [7] has
a common ground which is that in the macroeconomic literature little attention has been
given to the interaction between the financial sector and the macroeconomic variables, where
usually financial intermediaries are treated as veil. However, over the last decades there has
been a stream of literature which has emphasized the role of financial frictions on the ag-
gregate economic activity. The main works on this line are Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
[1], Bernanke and Gertler (1995) [2], Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) [10], Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) [4], Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) [3], Kocherlakota (2000) [11], Cooley, Ma-
rimom and Quadrini (2004) [6]. The main finding of these stream of papers is that financial
frictions play a key role explaining the evolution of macroeconomic aggregate variables.
There are two distinct important concepts on the effect of the financial sector on economic
activity that have to be clarified in order to understand the focus of the papers under
study. The first concept is financial frictions, which is a channel where different shocks
are propagated to the rest of the economy and as a result the effects could be amplified or
attenuated given its presence. The second concept is financial shocks, which is as its name
says a shock directly originated in the financial sector of the economy and has the potential
to impact the rest of the variables in the economy. The four papers under study include
both concepts in their models. However, the work of Jerman and Quiadrini (2009) [9] is the
only one which does not consider a financial intermediary (bank) in its framework.
The main focus of this work is to compare and contrast different ways of modeling
financial intermediaries. Therefore special attention will be given to the works of Christiano,
Motto and Rostagno (2006) [5], Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) [8], and Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2009) [7]. However, the work of Jerman and Quiadrini (2009) [9] is also analyzed
given the importance of financial frictions and financial shocks in its model.
The striking finding of these papers is that financial sector plays a crucial role in explain-
ing the evolution of macroeconomic aggregate variables. In particular, models that include
financial sector (with or without modeling financial intermediaries) are able to explain more
accurately the major downturns and booms of the last decades economic events in length
and depth. Also, it is found that financial shocks are as important (or more) as the standard
productivity technology in driving the major macroeconomic variables in the economy.
In section 2 I describe the models of the works under study and its dynamics paying
special attention to its distinctive features and differences. Section 3 discusses empirical
evidence on the importance of financial shocks, financial frictions and financial intermediary
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modeling. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 The Models
Among the papers under study Jerman and Quiadrini (2009) [9] is the only one that
does not consider a financial intermediary in its modeling. However, the financial sector
plays a crucial role in capturing the key dynamic features of the business cycle as well as
the behavior of financial flows such as equity payouts and debt payouts. In this paper the
economy is composed by two continuum of agents: households and firms. As usual household
maximizes their utility function depending on consumption and labor subject to a standard
budget constraint which includes equity shares and bonds issued by firms, which are the way
firms obtain financing. On the other hand, firms maximizes their equity value subject to two
important constraints in this model: i) a budget constraint which contains a quadratic cost
for firms payout (considered the financial frictions of the model), which accounts that issuing
equities to obtain financing is more costly than issuing debt, and ii) an enforcement constraint
in which the fraction that can be recovered in the sale of a defaulting firm (considered the
financial shock in this model) plays a crucial role in determining the credit conditions for
the firm. If the lender (household) can recover only a very small fraction of the value of a
defaulting firm, the credit conditions for the firm will be tight.
From the budget constraint of the firm the financial frictions arrive in this model. In
particular, assuming that firms can just issue equities to finance any extraordinary negative
liquidity event, a higher cost of issuing equities relative to bonds will make firms to cut labor
in order to have enough liquidity to operate according to its plan, this cut in labor will affect
the economic activity. Here the parameters governing the cost of issuing equities relative
to debt play a crucial role in the financial friction of the model, specifically this parameters
are tax benefit for issuing bonds (tax advantage for bonds make debt preferred to equity
for financing) and a cost parameter for issuing equities (captures rigidity of adjustment of
funds issuing equities and could be interpreted as an agency problem between managers and
owners of a firm). On the other hand, as mentioned above financial shocks arrive from the
enforcement constraint of the firm, specifically from a random variable which measures the
fraction of the value of the firm that can be recovered from a defaulting firm. Here the key
issue is that the credit conditions of the firm could be worsened if this fraction of recovery is
low (lenders are willing to make more loans if they can recover a higher portion of the firm
under default).
All together, a financial shock that worsen credit condition in this model will have a
negative effect on labor and output only if there exist financial frictions, (only if it is more
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costly for the firm to finance via issuing equities relative to bonds). As we can see, the key
issue here is on the side of the firm and not the lender. It is the firm who possibly has an
agency problem between its managers and owners which creates the financial friction (issuing
equity is costly). Also, the characteristics of the market plays a crucial role since the recovery
value of a defaulting firm is exogenous (here institutions and laws that permit lenders to
have more power in recovering value in case of default could enhance credit conditions in the
market).
The other three paper explicitly model financial intermediaries (banks), but in remarkably
different ways. On one hand, Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) [8] and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2009) [7] create financial frictions on the side of the lender (financial intermediaries). On the
other hand, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) [5] create financial frictions on the side
of capital managers individuals (entrepreneurs) and not the lender (financial intermediaries).
Therefore, an important distinction between these models is in which sector the financial
friction is created. Other aspect of the models that account for substantial difference are
financial shocks. In Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) [7] although there is space to create a
financial shock (I will discuss this point later), the authors just consider one type of shock
which is not created in the financial sector of the economy, which is a capital quality shock.
On its part, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) [5] and Goodfriend and McCallum
(2007) [8] consider explicitly financial shocks in the economy. In the model of Christiano,
Motto and Rostagno (2006) [5] there are three shocks related to the financial sector of the
economy: i) financial wealth shock (financial friction shock) , ii) banking sector technology
shock (financial intermediary shock), and iii) relative value of excess reserves shock (financial
intermediary shock). In the model of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) [8] there are two
types of shocks related to the financial sector of the economy: i) banking productivity shock
or loan productivity shock (financial intermediary shock) , and ii) effective collateral shock
or financial distress shock (financial intermediary shock).
I will now discuss Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) [8] model. As was mentioned above
this model creates financial frictions on the side of the lender (financial intermediaries)
and has two types of shocks related to the financial sector. There are three agents in the
economy household, firms and bank. The optimization problem of the model is solved in
one step for the households who are owner of the firms and bank. Households maximizes
an utility function which depends on consumption and labor (for firms and bank), subject
to three constraints: i) a budget constraint which incorporates high-powered money (which
equals reserves at the central bank) and government bonds, ii) sales equal to net production
constraint (needed to reflect monopolistic competition in the goods market), and iii) money
medium of exchange constraint, which requires that consumption must be related to deposits,
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which are the same time related to loans (considering also reserves at the central bank from
the balance sheet of the bank), and where loans have a specific production function (which is
the ‘analytical heart of the banking sector specification’). The production function for loans
depend on a combination of collateral (bond or capital, where bonds are more productive)
and labor. The two financial intermediary shock arrive in the production function for loans,
one making capital collateral more effective in producing loans and the other increasing
productivity of loans. Notice that since loan production is costly for the bank, an ‘external
finance premium’ which equals the real marginal cost of loan production arrives in the model
(external finance premium).
Regarding the mechanism of transmission of model the key ingredients come from includ-
ing a demand for money (money medium of exchange constraint) and a production function
for loans which includes collateral, this collateral creates financial frictions. To understand
why collateral will cause financial frictions assume that there is decrease in the economic
activity which pushes asset prices down and therefore pushes value of collateral down. Given
this events we will have to different transmission mechanism: i) accelerator, in which the
decrease in the value of collateral will increase the ‘external finance premium’ for a given
quantity of bank deposit demanded (can be seen as negative effect on loan supply curve
that shit it left), and ii) attenuator (particular for this model with demand for money), in
which the decrease in the economic activity will decrease the demand for deposit (decrease
demand for collateral) tending to drop the ‘external finance premium’ for a given value of
collateral (can be seen as a negative effect on the demand for loans that shift it left). The
equilibrium between supply and demand for banking services will determine the ‘external
finance premium’, which at the same time will affect the rest of the rest of the variables of
the model. Therefore, depending on the type of shock the financial friction (created in part
by collateral and also by introducing a demand for money) will have an accelerating or at-
tenuating effect in the economic activity. A policy implication is that a central bank unaware
of this mechanism could misjudge the effects of shocks in the economy given a determined
policy rule. The model also finds that the effects of the two financial intermediary shocks
(productivity in banking sector and financial distress) are major drivers of the macroeco-
nomic variables in the model, and therefore a central bank unaware of this mechanism will
misjudge its behavior.
As we can see in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) [8] model financial sector plays a
crucial role in explaining the dynamics of the economic variables. The way the introduce
the financial sector is by explicitly incorporating a bank in the model with two key feature
that makes a difference respect to other papers under study: i) money demand, and ii)
collateral in the production function. Its worth mentioning that he existence of money and
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banking in this model will create a ‘liquidity service yield’ for loans with collateral, therefore
interest rates for this loans will be lower than a default free instrument with no collateral.
Also money and banking in the model will force interbank interest rate to be lower than
the default free instrument with no collateral (they can not be equal given that this would
produce an excess supply of interbank credit).
The next model to be discussed is Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) [7] where financial frictions
are created on the side of the financial intermediary and there are no financial shocks taken
into account. In this model the economy is composed of one household with a continuum of
individual who maximize an utility function on consumption and labor, the budget constraint
includes deposits to the banks, there are two classes of continuum of firms located at a
continuum of areas: i) good producers who contract labor and capital to produce goods,
and ii) capital producers who face convex adjustment costs at producing new capital, and
there are also a continuum of banks located at different areas who captures deposits from
the public or funds from other banks in order to make loans in its area. The model is very
standard with respect to household and the two classes of firms, the key ingredient of the
model arrives in the banking sector where there is an agency problem given that at the end
of each period a banker may divert a fraction of deposits to its family. If a banker divert this
funds for its personal gains shut downs and creditors get just a fraction of their deposits from
the bank. As I mentioned before there is enough space in this model to test financial shocks,
although the authors don’t do it. One possible financial shock that could be incorporated to
the model is randomize the probability that banker exits next period and the other financial
shock that could have been incorporated is a randomization of the fraction that a bank
can divert to its family. However, the authors treat this two financial shocks as constant
parameters.
The agency problem generated in the banking sector will cause the financial friction in
this model. Particularly, since creditors recognize the bank’s incentive to divert funds, they
will restrict the amount they lend to the bank (bank face a borrowing constraint), and banks
will have less available funds to lend to the firms, which will affect the aggregate activity
in the economy. The agency problem could potentially affect the interbank and household
channel for the bank to obtain funds to lend.
The bank optimization problem of this model consist in the maximization of the value
function of the bank subject to an incentive constraint (to ensure that bank does not divert
funds) and a flow of funds (loans equal net worth plus deposits and interbank borrowing).
From the optimization problem of the bank we can manipulate the parameters in order to
generate the agency problem in household channel and also in the interbank channel, where
banks obtain funds to lend to the firms. A key aspect of the model is that firms obtain
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financing from the banks by issuing equities. In the case that net worth is reduced for any
given shock (the authors use a quality of capital shock) the incentive compatibility constraint
will become tighter which will heighten the agency problem, which will make banks to have
less available funds to lend to firms, and therefore they will not be able to buy as much
equity from the firms, bringing the price of capital down and also bringing interest rates up
(which can be understood as a contraction of the supply of loan funds). This increase in the
interest rate will propagate the negative effect in the economy and we will observe a sharpen
decline of the key macroeconomic variables such as output and investment. The problem
becomes more severe when the agency problem also exists in the interbank channel.
The authors propose three different types of unconventional credit policy to mitigate
the crisis, based on what the Federal Reserve has done during the recent financial crisis.
Each of these policies has advantage and disadvantage which will lead the central bank to
use a combination of them. One way to mitigate the crisis would be direct lending by the
acquisition of private securities by the central bank, in which case the central bank injects
funds directly to the firms. Other policy is opening a discount window lending in which
case the central bank lends funds to the financial intermediaries, and this way banks will
be able to acquire more equities from firms in the market. The other policy measure that
could be used to mitigate the crisis is equity injections where the central bank acquires
ownership position in banks paying a higher price and this way injecting funds and raising
asset demands by banks.
As we can see Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) [7] generate the financial friction problem in
the financial intermediary sector, but in contrast to Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) [8]
the problem is created in the channel between household (and also interbank market) and
banks and not between firms and bank (collateral).
Finally, I will discuss Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) [5] where financial friction
is created on the side of the entrepreneurs and there are there are three shocks related to
the financial sector of the economy: i) financial wealth shock (financial friction shock) , ii)
banking sector technology shock (financial intermediary shock), and iii) relative value of
excess reserves shock (financial intermediary shock). Before, explaining the model is worth
mentioning that this paper covers too many issues. Therefore, as has been done with the
other papers I will just focus on the financial friction and financial shocks of the model.
In this model the economy is composed by a continuum of agents who maximize utility on
consumption, labor and a broad category of money (currency, saving deposit, and demand
deposits), subject to a budget constraint which includes different types of deposits: i) saving
deposits, ii) time deposits, and iii) demand deposits), where the last two generate transaction
services, also a demand for labor a Calvo wage settings are considered in this optimization
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problem for the household. There are also other type of individuals which are called the
entrepreneur who have a key characteristic to know how to manage capital and therefore
are able to expand capital in the economy. This entrepreneurs, use loans and net worth to
purchase new capital, which they will use for rent (is easier to imagine imagine entrepreneurs
as buildings owners who rent capital to capital producers). Another key characteristic in
modeling entrepreneurs is that they face a random survival probability (which will be authors
to account for the financial friction shock), an increase in this probability is as a positive
financial wealth shock for the entrepreneurs who are now able to purchase more capital,
which will increase the capital price and their net worth, driving output, investment and
consumption up. There are also two classes of continuum of firms in the economy: i) good
producers, which optimize discounted profits in a standard way (they produce consumption
and investment goods), and ii) capital producers, who rent capital and purchase investment
goods (e.g. machinery) from goods producers to create new capital, again the optimization
problem is standard. Finally, there is a representative bank who is able to produce transac-
tion service for firms and entrepreneurs by obtaining funds from different types of liabilities
as mentioned before (saving deposits, time deposits, and demand deposits), which will cre-
ate different types of monetary aggregates in this economy. The production of transaction
services is characterized by a production function which considers capital, labor and excess
reserves to produce loans. In this production function is where financial intermediary shocks
arrive, one is a banking sector technology shock the other is a relative value of excess reserves
shock.
The financial friction mechanism plays a crucial propagation effect on the variables in this
model, given any shock that drive the price of capital down (including a negative financial
friction shock) by the called ‘Fisher debt-deflation channel’ entrepreneurs will be transferring
funds to the households, and since household do not know to manage capital there will be
an additional negative effect in the economy. Therefore, the financial friction mechanism is
generated by the ‘Fisher debt-deflation channel’. Other important feature of the model is
that not including banks will have little effect in most of the variables, except on shocks on
monetary policy. On its part, financial intermediary shocks have no major impact in the
variables of the model. The most important finding of the model is that the financial friction
shock (given by the probability of entrepreneur survival) is on of the most relevant drivers
in the business cycle dynamic of the model. Therefore, in this model financial frictions and
financial frictions shocks are the key variable that explain the business cycle fluctuations.
Finally, the authors find that including the banking sector in the model and its shocks have
little effect in this model. This results of the authors lead us to discover the most important
aspect of models that include the financial intermediaries, which is that in order that financial
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intermediaries to have an important role in propagating the shocks in the economy the
financial frictions of the model have to be introduced in the financial intermediary sector of
the economy, otherwise incorporating financial intermediaries is equivalent as treating them
as veil.
3 Empirical Evidence
The empirical findings of Jerman and Quiadrini (2009) [9] are that models considering
just technology shocks are not able to explain the business cycle fluctuation of real and
financial flows variables for the U.S. economy. In incorporating financial shocks improve
the model predictions for macroeconomic variables (especially labor) and financial flows
variables. Specifically, financial shocks permits to explain the recent financial crisis and
also the downturns in the recessions of 1990-1991 and 2001. As conclusion, tighter credit
conditions have a crucial role in explaining the recession for the U.S. economy since mid
1980s. Studying the second moments we are able to conclude that incorporating financial
shocks to the model with financial frictions permit us to match the volatility some variables
with the data for some key macroeconomic variables such us GDP, Investment, hours worked.
In Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) [8] it is found that incorporating money and banking
to the model permits to fit in the steady state the aggregate variables and interest rates to
the U.S. observable data. The model is specially successful in its steady state matching the
data for working time, capital output ratio, interbank rate, collateralized external finance
premium.
On its part, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) [7] are able to find that for the recent U.S.
financial recession a shock that triggers the financial friction (negative capital quality shock)
of around 5% permits us to explain the deep downturn of the U.S. economy. Under standard
business cycle model this is not possible since models fall short in explaining the fall in the
macroeconomic aggregates during this crisis.
Finanlly, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) [5] compare the out of sample perfor-
mance of their model for U.S. and the European Area (E.A.) . Using the root mean square
forecast error criterion they find mixed results for the different macroeconomic variables, in
some cases their model outperform other models in forecasting the variables of the model but
in some other cases not. Paying particular attention to the GDP forecast we observe that for
the E.A. their model behaves similar than other models (it does not better predicting GDP),
for the U.S. the performance of their model in predicting GDP does reasonably well. Other
key finding of their model is that for E.A. and U.S. a key driver of the GDP fluctuation
is the financial friction shock. Finally, their models permits to give an explanation to the
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‘boom-bust puzzle’ of late 90s and early 2000s by combining financial friction shocks and
the marginal efficiency of investment shock.
4 Conclusions
The discussion of the models analyzed in this work lead us to conclude the following:
1) DSGE models that consider financial sector perform better in explaining real macroe-
conomic variables than the standard DSGE models.
2) There is still little agreement in how to model the financial intermediaries.
3) There is no agreement on whether to focus the attention of financial disruption, which
could be between: i) household and banks, ii) banks and other banks, iii) entrepreneurs and
banks, or iv) firms and banks.
4) It is not clear whether incorporating an explicit financial intermediary shock makes
a real contribution to the model given that financial frictions in the financial intermediary
sector are able to propagate other types of shocks in the economy considerably well.
5) The main conclusion of this analysis is that in order that financial intermediaries play
a significant role in the economy the financial frictions have to be incorporated inside the
financial intermediaries sector, otherwise financial intermediaries will make no difference in
the model.
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